I've been meaning to post this for a while now, the moving final scene of Richard Attenborough's Oh! What A Lovely War... and there is no more fitting time.
YouTube user OhWhatALovelyWar has kindly posted all the musical numbers from the film - well worth checking out.
13 comments:
When I was growing up, The Great War never received much attention in history lessons (probably because WW2 was still so recent and fresh in the US cultural mind). To finally read as an adult about the while thing -- well, no words. The stupidity of some of the commanders especially appalled.
(Using "stupidity" advisedly, of course: 20-20 hindsight's easy brilliance. And for all I know, if I'd been in their shoes -- from that culture, at that time in history -- I might have done things exactly the same way, even if granted a look ahead to the next hundred years.)
Just queued this one up for rental. (Among the films which Netflix suggested in addition, based on its selection: Funny Girl and The Green Berets.) Thanks for putting it in my head.
[Er, of course that should have been "the WHOLE thing.]
Actually, there is a lot of bollocks written about the "stupidity" of the commanders. It became near compulsory in Britain to believe Haig was a heartless butcher. Haig, however, like Grant before him, and Zhukov after him, realized that when facing a numerically inferior but better trained opponent, certain options simply weren't available.
In the Great War, defense was massively easier than offense - the great advances - the machine gun, barbed wire, and mass artillery made offense much harder. Even when artillery could help an advance, it made following up the advance near impossible, because it destroyed the communications routes over which supplies would have to come. Remember too the advancing troops would be further from their supply bases, while the defending ones would be withdrawing towards theirs.
The British generals, especially Haig, were aware of this, and were open to new technological advances to seek to improve the situation - hence the British development of the creeping barrage to prevent enemy machine gunners waiting in bunkers, then returing to their posts once the guns stopped. But in the end, Germany was only going to be beaten by being bled white. Germany didn't have to attack - the Allies did - because Germany could sit back in the positions it had chosen after the advances of 1914.
The real villains were the politicians who went to war, and who refused to contemplate withdrawal from such strategic nightmares as the Ypres salient. And of course a special place in hell is reserved for that tosspot Churchill and his abortion at Gallipoli.
Well, you may say that the politicians were more to blame for failing to negotiate a peace when the hopelessness of the stalemate became apparent, BC, but I've never read anything about the high command - of any of the combatants - lobbying their politicians to end it. If attack has become in effect impossible because of the state of technology and the strength of the defensive positions, then it is pretty "stupid" to insist on continuing to attack. If the enemy can't be reduced by bombardment alone (and naval blockade, and maybe aerial attacks on supply hubs), then the war is 'over', pointless - and it should have been the generals making that argument most vigorously.... rather than adopting the obscene mindset that casualties in the tens of thousands (per day, per hour in some of the major assaults) were "acceptable".
I wonder how clear a view anyone had of how the war was really expected to come to an end. Did Haig believe that he could reduce German manpower to such an extent that they would no longer be able to maintain their armies in the field? How long was that supposed to take? Did anyone at the time envisage that three or four years of this attrition would lead not to the non-viability of the armies in the field but to massive social unrest and the collapse of states?
It isn't a General's job to set policy in a democracy, it is the General's job to implement policy. The policy was to win, and they did.
Tens of thousands per hour is an exaggeration for the British Army - the greatest casualty figure on one day for the British Army is 60,000 for the first day of the Somme. It's brutal enough that exaggerating it doesn't add anything.
It wasn't the Generals who demanded attack - they were told to attack by the politicians. Germany wasn't shifting. Now you can argue quite legitimately that the war wasn't worth it. But there was no other way of fighting it (and don't fall for the Liddell Hart self interested bullshit). British offensives were rarely when and where the general staff wanted. Often they were launched to relieve Allies - in particular mutinies by the French. The Somme, for example, changed majorly in the planning, as the French because of Verdun had to take on a smaller and smaller role.
And Haig's tactics worked. German manpower was reduced to such an extent it could essentially no longer field an army. Like the Confederates before them, and the Nazis after, they were reduced to eating the seed corn - conscripting children to fight. If you want to argue that it wasn't worth it, fine. But there was no other military way to win, especially given the special restrictions the British faced.
It is the job of the generals to advise on policy related to the military issues. Their advice - as far as I can see - was that the war was 'winnable'... at a price. That is a calculation I find impossible to justify.
My understanding of the final phase of the war is that Germany capitulated because of internal social tensions and the effects of blockade, not because of the reduction of manpower per se (they were still holding their positions at the front, even if increasing numbers of their soldiers were very young or very old). I find it very unconvincing to say that Haig's tactics "won" at all. And if they did, that is precisely what is unacceptable about the conduct of that war: you cannot base a strategy on the fact that your country is better able to bear the loss of a million men than your enemy.
60,000 is tens of thousands; and I believe there were a few other assaults that cost 10,000 or more. Often, the majority of casualties would be in the first hour or so. A few of the biggest Napoleonic and American Civil War battles had 10,000 plus casualties, but in WW1 this scale of slaughter was often being repeated on successive days, and happening dozens of times during the course of the conflict - this was far beyond the scale of any previous war.
It was winnable, at a price. History is the proof of that. It is a politician's job in a democracy to determine if that price is worth paying. Generals, like civil servants, present options.
Germany was utterly and totally bled dry. The blockade was a major part of its collapse, but you are simply incorrect to claim they were holding their positions - look at the Hundred Days Offensive, the Allied response to Operation Michel.
I agree that the casualties were unacceptable. But that is the fault of the people who choose to fight. There was simply no other way to fight and win. No other tactics would have worked. And yet Lloyd-George is seen as a hero, and Haig a villain. Insanity.
Yes, 60,000 is tens of thousands - but you said tens of thousands an hour. There's no need to over-dramatize the losses. They were horrific enough as is.
You can't absolve the generals of moral responsibility in this. If the scale of loss is "unacceptable", it should be unacceptable to military men just as much - or more - than to politicians.
What "options" did the generals present? How did they discuss the long-term strategy and the casualty projections with Downing Street? Why wasn't "not fighting" an option? Or at least "not fighting an offensive war, waiting for the blockade - or mere boredom and frustration - to do its work in undermining Germany's will to fight"?
I have read that most of the 60,000 first day deaths at the Somme occurred in the first two hours. And there were several other offensives which claimed losses well above 10,000, again a very high percentage of those in the first wave assault - so, it's not much of an exaggeration, if an exaggeration at all to say that casualties, on occasion, may have run as high as 10,000 an hour. It was certainly possible, the way those battles were fought. And that's just on one side. You appear to be attempting to downplay the casualties, BC.
Haig is vilified, I think rightly, as the architect of a grand strategy that was based on Britain's supposedly greater ability to absorb casualties in the hundreds of thousands. The fact that it was arguably in the end "a success" in determining the outcome of the war doesn't make it any less repugnant.
And how far did it really play out as he'd envisaged anyway? How far was the German collapse predictable even in mid-1918? How much longer could they have kept fighting without the domestic political turmoil? And how far was Britain away from similar social upheaval??
Again, exaggeration is a bad thing in this. There were simply not 60,000 first day deaths at the Battle of the Somme. There were approximately 60,000 casualties for the British Army, of which just under 20,000 were deaths.
Not fighting was an option - but it was an option thathad to be taken by politicians, not generals. I find it kind of worrying you think these should be military decisions - that way lies dictatorshop.
Waiting - well - there are various problems here. First, there is no evidence the blockade would have worked on its own. Second, it's the same tired argument that is used regarding Japan and nukes - the idea that starving a civilian population to death slowly is somehow morally more justifiable than direct military action. It's Catholicism at its worst - thou shalt not kill but needs not strive officiously to keep alive. Third - absent the British offenses, France would have collapsed, the BEF would have been completely outflanked and rolled up towards the sea.
It wasn't Haig's strategy as such - he just implemented it. He also implemented advances such as the creeping barrage which saved countless thousand British Army lives. Until anyone can come up with a viable alternative plan other than packing up and going home (which might have been a good idea, but, again, is a decision that can only be taken by a politician), then it strikes me as more than a little churlish to heap scorn on the General who won the damn war. Grant and Zhukov, though they have their detractors too, aren't viewed in the same way. It's a peculiarly British thing to do.
Bollocks - on just about every point.
Figure I've alway seen quoted for the Somme is 60,000 deaths. Maybe it's wrong: long time since I've read anything on it. But, you know, 20,000 is a lot. 2,000 is a lot. The scale of casualties in this war becomes depersonalizing - as Stalin supposedly said, "One death is a tragedy; a million is a statistic."
I've never suggested generals should have the final decision - only that they should have very persuasive (perhaps decisive) input into the decision-making process. It seems to me that the tendency of their input in WWI - from all sides - was to condone and encourage the continuation of the war, rather than to vigorously resist it.
And there is nothing undemocratic about refusing to accept the instructions of politicians. Quite the reverse. The popular will is expressed not merely through the ballot box buy by individual and collective action: democracy thrives on people - especially public servants - being principled enough to occasionally defy their governments. A brave and honourable general in WWI could have - should have - resigned rather than continue to implement that internecine strategy. It is 'undemocratic' to wield military force - or to threaten to do so - against your government or your people (hello, China); it's not 'undemocratic' - or a "road to dictatorship" - to have military commanders seek to influence military policy through advice and, if necessary, refuse to implement military policies they find unacceptable.
Grant and Zhukov inspire exaggerated affection and admiration from partisans of their causes. Non-affiliated observers often have plenty of criticisms to make of them. Haig's problem is that just about NO-ONE feels that degree of identity with the "cause" he was fighting for, or takes that kind of satisfaction in his "successes".
It's not "a peculiarly British thing" to criticise the military conduct of WWI. You'd struggle to find anyone who'd stand up for their generals in that war in France, Germany, or Russia either.
The blockade of Germany was working. Every account I've read suggests that it was certainly a major factor in Germany's collapse, probably the ultimately decisive factor (more so than the diminution of fighting manpower). However, shortages hadn't got so bad that people were starving to death - not in large numbers, anyway; not in the hundreds of thousands that the fighting had been claiming.
And your celebration of the "creeping barrage" seems odd. Everything I've read (and I'm thinking mostly about contemporary accounts here) is that it just didn't work... or had only fairly limited effectiveness. Casualties reduced, eh? But they were still HUGE on many occasions. And any reduction of casualties this tactic might have produced is surely offset by the larger numbers of attacks launched with exaggerated confidence in its effectiveness. The only way to reduce casualties significantly in that war would have been to eschew almost all offensive operations in the trenches.
Sorry - away from the computer for a few days.
1. If the figure you've always seen quoted for the Somme is 60,000 deaths, it tells me your sources on this simply cannot be trusted. Either they are just bad sources, or they have a motive to treble the deaths, and so cannot be trusted.
2. Oddly enough, it was me in every single freaking post who said there is no need to exaggerate the numbers. I said that 20,000 deaths is a huge amount. To try and turn that back on me is dishonest and unfair.
3. If a general, let's say Haig, had refused to continue the war it would have done one thing alone - resulted in Haig's dismissal. That's the way things work in democracies. In that case, a General who would have launched an attack would have been found. What on earth is the difference? I'm not claiming Haig was some hero or anything - just that he was a very good General. Generals' job descriptions are not to decide whether wars should be fought or not, they are to win wars that politicians chose to fight. And that is what Haig did. It's inconceivable to me that you do not see that mutiny is anti-democratic. Refusing to carry out the orders of the democratic government? It's what the Army did in Northern Ireland to Wilson, and it's a form of a coup.
4. Grant and Zhukov are criticized, but basically seen by their own countrymen as victorious Generals who won wars. Haig isn't. Zhukov was loved by the Red Army for decades after the war - hence his exile by Stalin. The French worshipped Petain after Verdun, and he only became unpopular after Vichy.
5. Yes the blockade was working. You still haven't suggested how you think it is more noble to cause deaths of women and children by malnutrition than to risk military casualties, but there you go. The deaths weren't by starvation, but the blockade kileld - if it didn't kill, it didn't work. But lets look what would have happened had the Froog plan been followed. The British sit in their trenches, and refuse offensive operations, relying on the blockade. The Germans, having significantly better positions in particular in the British areas, can move troops away from the British zone to the French one. Absent the Somme, and in particular the British contribution, Verdun almost certainly falls. The French line is ruptured beyond cure. Germany can now move through at will, and roll up the BEF to the Belgian coast. War over.
A German victory in WW1 isn't necessarily a tragedy. But to suggest generals should have been willing to do something that would indisputably resulted in defeat is asinine in the extreme. Instead they realized (a) offensives were necessary to support our Allies; and (b) advances in tactics could be used to mitigate the costs of such offensives, such as the creeping barrage. It wasn't perfect, but nothing was at that time.
Granted there may have been some "casualty creep" in accounts of the major WW1 battles; it happens very easily with all wars. (Although I'm surprised that the supposedly "inflated" figures have become so commonplace for WW1, because it has been so thoroughly researched and written about; and because, as far as I recall, the contemporary reports always seemed to differentiate very carefully between numbers of 'killed', 'missing', and 'wounded'.)
Petain and some of the other French generals are maybe given an easier time because they were seen as having helped to "save France". You miss my point that Haig suffers the same stigma (as Grant and Zhukov) of being sometimes profligate in the expense of manpower, without any of the compensatory effect of anyone taking any satisfaction in his "victory".
Mutiny is about the most democratic thing there is - since it is usually defined in terms of the common soldier revolting against the military command. A concerted attempt to frustrate or undermine the government (the government's civil policy) by cabals of army officers is a coup - yes, that's undemocratic. But not at all the same thing.
If one officer, or even a large number of officers refuses to carry out a set of orders, they can be replaced, or substitutes found (the China TAM instance again). And they should have the decency to resign, rather than be fired, if it is a stand of principle like that. However, if enough officers make that stand, the government may have to rethink its attitude (even if they haven't run out of qualified officers to take these contentious commands). And - if we're talking about military policy here, not civil policy - I see nothing wrong with that. It's not the job of the military leadership only to advise on how wars should be fought, but on which wars can and cannot (and hence should not) be fought.
If Haig had resigned rather than continue the War in the face of such calamitous losses, the government might have had to reconsider its policy for the conduct of the War. If one or more of his likely replacements had done likewise, they definitely would have done.
Even if generals could be found to continue the conduct of the war in that fashion, at least Haig's conscience would be clear - and his reputation today would be much higher.
I'm not convinced the Germans could have achieved an easy victory, if Britain had switched to a more defensive strategy. It's really impossible to know how the War might have played out under altered circumstances, especially at this distance in time (even if you've done a lot of detailed original research on the troop positions and relative strengths and so on; I don't doubt you're much more widely read on this than me, but you haven't done that depth of research on it - I've heard army officers and Sandhurst military historians arguing over these issues, without anything approaching the glib certainties you seem to have).
I worry as soon as people start talk of "mitigating casualties". The problem, as I understand it, with the 'creeping barrage' idea was that it didn't work at all. Or, it didn't work nearly as well as it was supposed to. And so, large numbers of attacks were mounted with the expectation of low - or "tolerable" - casualties, and were met with cruel surprise. The bombardment wasn't accurate enough, the defensive positions were more robust than anticipated, or the Germans had adapted to the tactic and knew how to time their retreat and re-advance, and so on and so on. Not much "mitigation" going on there, if the assault might not even have been launched if the likely casualties had been correctly assessed beforehand.
A blockade does not have to kill people to be successful. It doesn't even necessarily have to reduce the population to a condition of starvation. It just has to make things unpleasant enough, for enough people, that it undermines the will to fight, foments social unrest, and puts pressure on government to reconsider its policy. Few, if any, wars have ever been fought to the point of total annihilation of one side. It's usually a case of obtaining a psychological domination, of waiting for 'the other guy to blink', to say "ouch, no, this hurts too much" and give in. The remarkable - and terrible - thing, I find, about WW1, is that all previous conceptions of where that point might have been were vastly exceeded... whether you're talking about total loss of manpower, or percentage loss, or expense, or damage to the economies of the participants... it just kept on going far beyond the point where you would have expected everyone to call a halt. And I fear the attitude of generals like Haig - in saying, "Well, you know, I think it is winnable if we just keep going on like this" - was largely to blame for that.
I think targeting the civilian population - if it can be done in a way which does not result in deaths, or results in deaths on a far smaller scale than the likely death toll on the battlefield - can certainly be justified.
I said in one of my 'bon mots' a little while ago, that I thought the essence of war was to achieve as many of your objectives as possible (or a satisfactory number, at any rate) at minimum cost to yourself. An ideal ethical approach to war (an impossible notion, perhaps!) would add 'at minimum cost to your opponent' as well.
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